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Since the submission of this manuscript, the international climate surrounding 
extradition and the death penalty continues to change.  For example, Mexico has 
asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague to stop the United 
States from executing dozens of Mexicans held on death row on the grounds that 
the Mexican citizens were not informed of their consular rights.  BBC News, 
Mexico Seeks to Block U.S. Executions, (Jan. 21, 2003) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2678775.stm.
In addition, Germany recently told the United States it will withhold evidence 
against September 11 suspect Zacarias Moussaoui unless it receives assurances the 
information will not be used to secure a death penalty against him.  BBC News, 
Germany Withholds Moussaoui Evidence,  (Sept. 1, 2002) available at
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2229231.stm.  The author submits 
that these new developments further strengthen the thesis advanced herein.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to a recent poll, Americans favor military trials,
without the right of appeal, for foreign terrorists, and agree that 
military courts should be able to sentence foreign terrorists to 
death.1  Attorney General John Ashcroft responded to European 
critics (who are resisting extradition to the United States of death-
eligible members of the al-Qaeda terrorist network) by saying: “I 
believe the law, which is clear in relation to capital punishment in 
the United States, is a law that we ought to be able to enforce.”2
President George Bush responded to Spanish criticism of military 
courts for al-Qaeda terrorists:
It is the right decision to make and I will explain that to 
any leader who asks . . . .  I look forward to explaining to 
my friend, the president of Spain, why I made the
decision . . . .  It makes eminent sense to have the military 
tribunal option available . . . .  It makes sense for national 
security purposes.  It makes sense for the protection of 
potential jurors, it makes sense for homeland security.3
Americans and their government are apparently in accord.
They agree that foreign-born terrorists should be quickly tried in 
military courts, with no appeal, and there face the possibility of the 
death penalty.  Many Americans, and apparently some in the 
Executive Branch of government, may be surprised to learn that 
much of the world disagrees with the U.S., and more importantly, 
will not cooperate—even on a matter as pressing as bringing 
members of al-Qaeda to justice—in extraditing such persons if they 
face the death penalty or military trials.4
1. National Public Radio (NPR) reported that 64% of respondents favored 
military tribunals for non-citizens suspected of terrorist activities and captured
outside of the United States; 61% thought that there should be no appeal to 
civilian courts; and 68% felt that the court should have the power to sentence 
someone to death.  At the same time, only 23% would have favored a military 
court for Timothy McVey for bombing the Oklahoma City Federal Building. 
NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School Poll on Civil Liberties: Military Tribunals (Nov. 25, 2001), 
at
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/civillibertiespoll/civilliberties_supplement.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
2. Joe Murphy & David Wastell, Britain Angers America on Terrorist Extradition 
Deal, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), October 7, 2001, at 01.
3. Duncan Campbell, War in Afghanistan: Let UN Team in or Else, Bush Warns 
Iraq, THE GUARDIAN (London), November 27, 2001, at 5.
4. As will be explained in Parts II & III, these countries usually only extradite 
after the requesting country provides assurances that the death penalty will not be 
imposed or executed.
2
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This article will review international extradition law regarding 
the surrender of fugitives from countries that do not have capital 
punishment to countries that do (111 countries have abolished 
capital punishment5).  While this issue is broader than al-Qaeda,
and even broader than terrorism, the issue has increased
significance after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon.
II. THE PROBLEM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
At least since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty 
Years War,6 international law has dealt predominately with
sovereign nation states rather than individual people.  Under this 
concept, an individual had “no remedy of his own” and it was left to 
the states to take up the case of one of its citizens abroad.7  Aside
“from a few anomalous cases . . . individuals were not subject of 
rights and duties under international law.”8  World War II,
beginning with the Nuremberg trials, and the creation of the 
United Nations, transformed attitudes about the Nation State and 
its obligations to individuals.9  Nowhere is this remarkable change 
more evident than in the conjunction of extradition with the death 
penalty as a human rights issue.  The push to bring terrorists to an 
5. Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty: An International 
Perspective, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.html (noting that 
as of August 2002, 111 total nations are now abolitionist in law or in practice, 76 
for all crimes, 15 for ordinary crimes, and 20 are abolitionist de facto).
6. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 5 (6th ed., 1963); R.R. PALMER & JOEL
COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 126-131 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 3d ed. 
1965).
7. BRIERLY, supra note 6, at 277.
8. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982).
9. Id. at 1.  Sohn states:
The modern rules of international law concerning human rights are 
the result of a silent revolution of the 1940’s, a revolution that was 
almost unnoticed at the time.  Its effects have now spread around the 
world, destroying idols to which humanity paid obeisance for centuries.
Just as the French Revolution ended the divine rights of kings, the 
human rights revolution that began at the 1945 San Francisco
Conference of the United Nations has deprived the sovereign states of 
the lordly privilege of being the sole possessors of rights under
international law.  States have had to concede to ordinary human 
beings the status of subjects of international law, to concede that 
individuals are no longer mere objects, mere pawns in the hands of 
states.
Id.
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acquaintance with the United States’ brand of justice, including the 
death penalty with military courts meeting that penalty out,
coupled with the refusal of many countries to extradite under those 
conditions, gives the issue both currency and importance far
beyond what it otherwise might have had if the issue had been 
limited to a few relatively obscure fugitives.
Extradition of people who face the death penalty now attracts 
worldwide attention and opposition10 and threatens to interfere 
with U.S. foreign policy.11  Even if the United States were to capture 
Osama bin Laden and his associates, trial in military courts,12 or 
10. On May 28, 2001 the South African Constitutional Court ruled that the 
deportation of a suspected al-Qaeda terrorist to the United States where he faced 
the death penalty violated the South African Constitution.  Mohamed and
Another v. President of the RSA and Others, [2001] (7) BCLR 685, 2001 SACLR 
LEXIS 37 (CC).  South Africa is only one of many Nations that will not extradite 
even al-Qaeda terrorists to nations that might impose the death penalty.  It seems 
highly unlikely that any of the 15 member states of the European Union would 
extradite anyone facing the death penalty without assurances that the death 
penalty would not be sought or imposed. See, e.g., Julian Knowles, More Haste, Less 
Justice, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 2001, at Law 5; Bill Glauber, Europe Moves to 
Unify Efforts Against Terror, BALT. SUN., Sept. 30, 2001, at A8; Stephen Romei, Powers
at Odds on Executions -- War on Terror, THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 6, 2001, at 13; 
Ellen Hale, Death Penalty Could Affect Extradition, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2001, at A6; 
Frances Gibb, EU Extradition Deal Falters, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 28, 2001, at 
4M; Spain Rules Out Extradition of Terror Suspects to US, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 
23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25069895; Ron Fournier, Bush, Aznar Set Aside 
Differences, ASSOCIATED PRESS, AP ONLINE, Nov. 28, 2001, at *1
11. For a detailed exposition of how human rights differences with allied 
nations interferes with U.S. interests and policies, see generally Matthew W.
Henning, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions can Lead to
International Incidents, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 347 (1999).  For post-
September 11 commentary, see Joyelyn Noveck, France’s Anti-Terrorism Judge, Revered 
by Some and Resented By Others, Tracks Suspects Across the Globe, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 4, 2001 at *1.  Noveck relates the activities of Jean-Louis Bruguiere
“France’s hard-driving, antiterrorism judge,” who worries that cooperation on 
counter terrorism efforts between the United States and France “will suffer if the 
Bush administration uses military tribunals to try foreigners. Id.  Like other 
European countries, France will not extradite suspects who might face a military 
tribunal or the death penalty.” Id.
12. William R. Slomanson, Should We Try Bin Laden in Court?, THE SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 7, 2001, at B9.  Slomanson argues:
If the United States tries bin Laden, then the United States stands in 
the shoes of Israel when it captured Adolf Eichmann, Hitler’s prime 
planner of the Final Solution, for trial in Tel Aviv.  Israel was thus 
criticized because its local judges could not be perceived as being 
impartial, given the heinousness of Eichmann’s crimes.
If the United States were to capture bin Laden or some key associates
as this long-term war wages on, it is not hard to predict an
international outcry to establish an incident-specific tribunal like the 
4
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imposition of the death penalty, would likely generate international 
furor.
III. EXTRADITION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Administrative Difficulties With the Death Penalty: 
Soering v. U.K.13
Jens Soering’s murderous rampage, killing his girlfriend’s 
parents, might well have been just another vicious double homicide 
with little repercussion beyond the immediate parties.14  Had he 
been caught, convicted and executed in the United States, his case 
might have merited only the odd passing footnote.  Instead,
Soering, a German national, fled to and was captured in Great 
Britain, setting off an international chain of events with continuing 
reverberations that now affect the war on terrorism.  The Soering
case provides the jurisprudential underpinning for many human 
rights obstacles to extradition under international law.  It may well 
be one of the most cited15 international cases and it is, in all 
likelihood, the most important international extradition case of the
one in the Netherlands that tried Libya’s Pan Am 103 bombers last 
year.  Trial in the United States would amount to a preconceived
result, accompanied by a mock trial. Egypt—which broke ranks with 
the rest of the Arab League in the 1978 Camp David Agreement with 
Israel—effectively split with the United States on this very point.  It was 
the first country to suggest that the United States seek a resolution in 
an international judicial proceeding.
Id.
13. Soering v. U.K., 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989).
14. The murder rate in the United States has ranged from about 20,700 in 
1988 to 16,900 in 1998. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES §5, 203 (2000).  Even among capital cases, Jens Soering’s case was 
but one of many.  As of December 4, 2001, there had been 746 executions in the 
United States since the reintroduction of capital punishment in 1977. DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, EXECUTIONS IN THE U.S. 2001, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexec01.html.  By 2002 there were 3,718
persons on death row in the U.S. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, SIZE OF 
DEATH ROW BY YEAR, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRowInfo.html#year (last visited Nov. 11,
2002).
15. A Lexis-Nexis search for cases citing Soering conducted on December 4, 
2001 found two United States Supreme Court opinions citing Soering, one
Australian case, twenty-one Canadian cases, forty-three United Kingdom cases, and 
the Commonwealth and Irish file folder under Lexis-Nexis (which overlaps the 
previous categories somewhat) contained fifty-seven citations.
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Twentieth Century.16
Jens Soering, aged 18, suffered from a well-recognized
psychiatric syndrome known as ‘folie ˆ deux’17 which lessened 
“mental responsibility for his acts.”18  According to the psychiatric 
evidence, Soering’s personality became submerged into that of his 
profoundly disturbed and delusional girlfriend who persuaded him 
that “he might have to kill her parents for she and him to survive as 
a couple.”19
Both the United States and Germany sought to extradite and 
try him for the double homicide occurring in Bedford County, 
Virginia.  Germany’s attempt appears to have been an effort to 
spare one of their nationals from the death penalty.20  Although its 
request to extradite Soering was eventually denied,21 the fact that 
Germany pursued such an uncommon strategy22 against U.S. wishes 
can be seen as demonstrating an increasing European aversion 
towards extraditing persons who might be subject to the death 
penalty.  It is likely that Germany would not have interfered in what 
was otherwise an inconsequential extradition matter between the 
United Kingdom and the United States but for the possibility of the 
imposition of the death penalty on one of its nationals.  The case 
also demonstrates a heightened sensitivity towards consideration of 
international human rights norms in extradition matters, and a 
concomitant erosion23 of the rule of non-inquiry.24
16. “The best known case brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights in the field of extradition is that of Soering v. United Kingdom.”  Peter 
Hodgkinson, Europe-A Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of Abolitionist
Strategies, 26 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 625, 629 (2000).  Matthew W. Henning calls it “one 
of the most famous cases of international extradition law.”  Henning, supra note
11, at 355.
17. Also known as “shared psychotic disorder.”  Individuals affected by the 
disorder “usually have a close relationship with a dominant person . . . whose 
psychotic thinking they come to share.”  RONALD J. COMER, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 350 (1996).
18. Soering v. U.K., App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 446  (1989).
19. Id.
20. Unlike English courts which ordinarily do not exert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over their citizens. Id. at 448, German courts can apply their own 
national criminal law to acts committed abroad by a German National, but in the 
case of murder would not impose the death penalty. Id. at 461-62.
21. Id. at 445.
22. Id. at 452 (noting that “[c]oncurrent requests for extradition in respect of 
the same crime from two different States are not a common occurrence”).
23. Matthew W. Henning, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions
Can Lead to International Incidents, 22 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 347, 356-57
(1999).  Henning writes:
6
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The combination of these two themes—the move in the 
direction of viewing the death penalty as a per se human rights 
violation and the increasing willingness to look behind extradition 
requests where human rights violations are alleged—is, in part, the 
focus of the present inquiry.  However, Soering does not go so far as 
to make the death penalty a per se bar to extradition.25  It was only 
the first step in a process that continues to this day.
The United Kingdom deemed the United States (which had 
made the earlier request for extradition,26 and which was also the 
locus of the crime) to be the appropriate jurisdiction to which 
Soering should be extradited.27  The matter of the death penalty, 
however, remained an obstacle.28
Article IV of the United Kingdom-United States Extradition 
Treaty provides in part: “extradition may be refused unless the 
requesting Party gives assurance satisfactory to the requested Party 
that the death penalty will not be carried out.”29  Responding to this 
provision in the extradition request, the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
for Bedford County, Virginia certified that “a representation will be 
made in the name of the United Kingdom to the judge at the time
of sentencing that it is the wish of the United Kingdom that the 
death penalty should not be imposed or carried out.”30  The 
prosecutor gave no further assurances and stated that he intended 
to pursue the death penalty at trial “because the evidence . . .
supported such action.”31  In the face of this less than ironclad 
representation,32 the United Kingdom decided to allow the
[T]he ECHR’s decision presented the prospect that European courts 
could abandon the principle of non-inquiry and conduct their own 
examinations of the human rights record of requesting states.  The 
decision also validated the practice of courts in civil law countries 
undertaking meaningful review of the requesting countries’
extradition petitions and possibly expanding the review to include the 
requesting countries’ human rights practices.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
24. “The ‘rule of non-inquiry’ usually requires extradition courts to refrain 
from undertaking inquiries into the justice systems of foreign countries.”  Cornejo-
Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000).
25. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 499.
26. Id. at 445.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 444.
29. Id. at 451.
30. Id. at 445.
31. Id. at 446.
32. The Divisional Court observed, “the assurance leaves something to be 
desired.” Id. at 447.
7
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extradition33 and the case wound its way from the European
Commission on Human Rights to the European Court of Human 
Rights.34
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (which came into force in 
1953) did not abolish capital punishment.35  Indeed, Article 2 of 
the Convention expressly reserved the ultimate punishment under 
certain narrowly defined circumstances.36  As of the date of the 
Soering case, the United Kingdom had not ratified Optional
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention (which obligated contracting 
nations to abolish capital punishment).37 Thus, despite Amnesty 
International’s efforts as Amicus Curiae,38 Soering did not present a 
promising vehicle for a per se rule against extraditing a person 
facing a possible death sentence in the requesting country.
Nonetheless, Soering presented difficult issues involving the 
administration of the death penalty.  Article 3 of the Convention 
provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.”39  While the death penalty 
might not be a per se violation of human rights under the
Convention, it was open to question whether its administration in 
the United States constituted “inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”40
33. Id. at 448 (“[O]n 3 August 1988 the Secretary of State signed a warrant 
ordering the applicant’s surrender to the United States authorities”).
34. Id. at 463.
35. See The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html.
36. Article 2 § 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides: “Everyone’s right to life shall be
protected by law.  No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in 
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which 
this penalty is provided by law.”  The next section proceeds to exempt various 
legitimate law enforcement actions, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html.
37. Peter Hodgkinson, Europe A-Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and
Critique of Abolitionist Strategies, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 625, 661 (2000).  The United 
Kingdom formally ratified Optional Protocol No. 6 on January 27, 1998. Id. at 
661.  The United Kingdom had abolished capital punishment in 1965 for murder
but retained the penalty for cases of treason, piracy involving violence, and various 
offenses under military law. Id. at 638.
38. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 457 (1989).
39. Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html.
40. Id.
8
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Jens Soering presented a particularly sympathetic case for this 
sort of analysis.  He was young and highly suggestible.41  He 
suffered from a mental disorder that likely would have provided a 
partial defense (short of the all-or-nothing insanity defense) in 
Great Britain42 but not in Virginia.43  If he were to be sentenced to 
death he realistically could expect to spend 6-8 years on death 
row.44  Thus, it would give rise to the “death row phenomenon.”45
Most tellingly, contrary to the extradition treaty expectations, the 
assurances given (that the prosecutor would advise the judge of the 
United Kingdom’s position while continuing to pursue a death
verdict) left little doubt that the possibility of the imposition of the 
death penalty remained a realistic possibility.46  Finally, there was 
no need for Soering to escape punishment entirely.47  Germany was 
willing to prosecute him, and there he would not face the death 
penalty.48  In retrospect, it seems obvious that U.S. interests would 
have to give way.  It remained to be seen just how problematic for 
U.S. foreign policy this case ultimately would be.
The European Court of Human Rights held that extradition
under these conditions would constitute inhuman or degrading 
treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention for the 
41. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 443.
42. Id. at 446.
43. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985) (“[E]vidence 
of a criminal defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense is, in the absence 
of an insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of guilt.”); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 
423 S.E.2d 360, 368 (Va. 1992) (holding that the defense was not permitted to 
offer a manslaughter defense based on diminished capacity).
44. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 457.
45. The death row phenomenon refers to the suffering of prisoners who 
await execution for long periods of time.  The issue is whether the death row 
phenomenon constitutes “inhuman or degrading” treatment within the terms of 
the relevant human rights treaty.  Perhaps the most extensive analysis of this
phenomenon was undertaken by the Privy Council Office Judicial Committee in 
Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 2 A.C.1, 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993).  Their 
Lordships wrote:
There is an instinctive revulsion against the prospect of hanging a man 
after he has been held under sentence of death for many years.  What 
gives rise to this instinctive revulsion?  The answer can only be our 
humanity; we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the 
agony of execution over a long extended period of time.
Id. at 29.
46. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 445-47.
47. Id. at 444-45.
48. Id.
9
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.49  The 
death penalty, it held, was not an absolute bar to extradition, with 
or without adequate assurances, but the precedent had been set for 
human rights challenges to extradition requests carrying the
possibility of the death penalty.50
Judge De Mayer’s lone concurring opinion in Soering advanced 
the stronger position that the death penalty by itself, aside from any 
implementation or administrative problems, constitutes a bar to 
extradition unless the requesting state provides appropriate
assurances.51  In Judge De Mayer’s view, “the most important issue 
in this case is not ‘the likelihood of the feared exposure . . . to the 
death row phenomenon’ but the very simple fact that his life would 
be put in jeopardy by the said extradition.”52  Judge De Mayer went 
on to argue that “[w]hen a person’s right to life is involved, no 
requested State can be entitled to allow a requesting State to do 
what the requested State is not itself allowed to do.”53  This view has 
not received much scholarly attention.54  This article, however, 
argues that it has become the basis for future international
extradition cases involving the death penalty.55  Moreover, it is 
indicative of an increasingly common judicial attitude that permits 
greater scope for consideration of human rights norms in
extradition matters generally and a greater impatience with strict 
adherence to the rule on non-inquiry.
This article holds, contrary to earlier scholarly opinion56 (but 
in line with Judge De Mayer), that this fact-based or “balancing” 
inquiry is, in part, because of the world-wide movement towards 
abolition of the death penalty.57  This movement is veering towards 
49. Id. at 448.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 483-85.
52. Id. 483-84 (De Mayer, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. A Lexis-Nexis search revealed only two articles that referred to Judge De 
Mayer’s concurring opinion in Soering v. United Kingdom.
55. See infra Part III.A.-D.
56. See John Dugard & Vanden Wyngert, Reconciling Extradition With Human 
Rights, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 187, 197 (1998) (“As international law does not prohibit 
the death penalty, the fact that the fugitive will be executed if returned to the 
requested state cannot per se obstruct extradition.  The manner of execution,
however, may constitute cruel or inhuman punishment, in which case extradition
should be refused.”) (citations omitted).  While their decision was clearly correct 
in 1998, subsequent decisions may have so undercut their thesis so as to warrant a 
stronger position.
57. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
10
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a per se rule absolutely barring nations from extraditing from 
abolitionist countries to retentionist countries, unless adequate 
assurances are obtained.  If true, this trend presents challenges for 
U.S. foreign policy in general, and specifically in the war against 
terrorism.  It also has profound implications for other similar 
human rights issues such as the use of military courts in the
formally undeclared war against terrorism.  We take these issues up 
in the next sections.
IV. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A PER SE RULE BARRING EXTRADITION
ABSENT ASSURANCES THAT THE DEATH PENALTY
WILL NOT BE IMPOSED
A. Consolidation and Expansion of the Soering Rule
The Soering case turned on Article 3 of the Convention
(concerning inhuman or degrading treatment) in part because the 
United Kingdom had not as of the date of the case ratified the 
Optional Protocol No. 6 completely abolishing the death penalty.58
The Court had no reason to consider whether a country that had 
fully abolished the death penalty and had ratified Protocol No. 6 
could automatically refuse to extradite absent truly adequate
assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed or
executed.
Aylor-Davis v. France, involved a country that had ratified
Optional Protocol No. 6, but the United States had, in that case, 
given adequate assurances that the death penalty would not be 
imposed.  In that posture, the European Human Rights
Commission ruled that the extradition would not violate either 
Article 3 or Protocol No. 6.59
Protocol 6’s absolute wording,60 combined with the fact that its 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d Ed. (Cambridge 1997); Ariane M. Schreiber, States That 
Kill: Discretion and the Death Penalty - A Worldwide Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
263, 278-84 (1996) (outlining international efforts to abolish the death penalty); 
Hodgkinson, supra note 16, at 629 (outlining European efforts to abolish the 
death penalty); Ved P. Nanda, Bases For Refusing International Extradition Requests -
Capital Punishment and Torture, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1369, 1370-1394 (2000).
58. Hodgkinson, supra note 37, at 630.
59. Id.
60. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Mar. 
1, 1985, art. 1, Europ.T.S. No. 114, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (“The death penalty
11
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commands are non-derogable61 and that countries cannot make 
reservations62 thereto, lends credence to the view that the duty to 
seek adequate assurances may well be absolute and not dependent 
on the receiving state’s good or bad administration of its death 
penalty.  Nonetheless, in Netherlands v. Short, the Dutch High Court 
“was not prepared to find that the Sixth Protocol took precedence” 
over other international obligations.63  However, the court did 
refuse to extradite after balancing the interests of both parties.64
While Short followed the Soering balancing of interests model and 
was not predicated on Protocol No. 6 as an absolute bar to
extradition, the decision was clearly influenced by Protocol No. 6.
Short may be seen as a transitional case much like the many 
transitional cases that occurred in the United States with regard to 
the issue of the right to counsel.  The United States Supreme 
Court’s first, hesitant due process balancing analysis under Powell v. 
Alabama65 was followed by several smaller steps66 before the absolute
rule requiring counsel in all felony cases was finally imposed by 
Gideon v. Wainwright.67  It is not uncommon in the development of 
the law for a rule to begin as a fact-bound response to a shocking 
fact pattern and to be transformed into an absolute rule by later 
shall be abolished.  No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.”).
Article 2 provides the only exceptions, allowing the death penalty for “acts
committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war.” Id. at art. 2.
61. Id. at art. 3.
62. Id. at art. 4.
63. Dugard & Wyngert, supra note 56, at 193.
64. Id. (“On this basis, it held that Short’s interest in not being handed over 
should prevail over the Government’s interest in extraditing him to the United 
States.”).
65. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell involved seven young African Americans 
known as the “Scottsboro boys” who were sentenced to death in a trial without the 
aid of counsel. Id. at 50.  The Supreme Court held that whether due process 
required counsel should be decided on a case-by-case basis and based on the 
egregious facts of the case, the court should have appointed counsel. Id. at 65.
The case, and its jurisprudential implications, is described at some length in Alan 
W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty 
Habeas Corpus, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1327, 1335-44 (1995).
66. See, e.g., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948) (circumstances 
peculiar to the case may render trial fundamentally unfair unless the defendant 
has the aid of counsel); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 680 (1948) (counsel
required as a matter of course in all capital cases); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 
(1942) (states not required to provide counsel in non-capital state proceedings 
unless on the totality of the facts one would be necessary for a fair trial); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (counsel required to be appointed in federal 
trials unless knowledgeably waived).
67. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts, 316 U.S. 455).
12
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somewhat less shocking, but nonetheless compelling, cases piled on 
one after the other.  The process may not yet be complete in the 
extradition of death-eligible persons under international law but 
the trend is plain.  While predictions about the law’s likely
development are hazardous, as will be demonstrated, the trend is in 
the direction of an absolute rule not dependent on delicate fact 
balancing.
Optional Protocol No. 6 only applies to nations within the 
Council of Europe that have ratified the accord.68  Whatever its 
status as a Pan-European treaty, Protocol No. 6 cannot provide 
more than persuasive force to other non-European nations.  Thus, 
the majority analysis in Soering, which encouraged fact balancing 
that at least sometimes allowed for the extradition of persons who 
were death-eligible in the receiving nation, continued to play an 
important role in forming international opinion.  Indeed, until the 
trend towards a per se rule is absolutely established, Soering’s
equivocal rationale is likely to continue to play a role in
international decision-making in at least some parts of the world.
In addition, notwithstanding the status of a per se rule in death 
penalty matters, Soering’s mode of analysis will continue to have 
force in other analogous matters such as the use of military trials 
where injection of human rights issues and balancing of facts will 
probably continue.
Soering’s “death row phenomenon” analysis very quickly
influenced cases around the world.69  Treatment of Reference re Ng 
68. Thirty-nine nations within the Council of Europe had ratified Protocol 
No. 6 as of August 12, 2001.  Three nations had signed the Protocol but had not 
yet ratified it.  Council of Europe, Legal Protocol No. 6 has been amended by 
eleven nations which in turn, has been ratified by forty-one nations, but two 
signatories have not yet ratified as of August 12, 2001.  Council of Europe, Legal 
Affairs, Treaty Office available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm. Protocol No. 11
restructures the control machinery including the European Court of Human 
Rights.  Council of Europe, Legal Affairs, Treaty Office, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm.  For a history of the 
abolition of the death penalty in Europe and a state by state analysis of the 
ratification of Protocol No. 6 see Hodgkinson, supra note 37.
69. Not all of the influenced cases were extradition cases.  One of the most 
famous death row phenomenon cases involved an appeal to the Privy Council 
alleging that the harsh death row conditions in Jamaica constituted cruel,
inhuman and degrading punishment.  Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 
[1994] 2 A.C.1, (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jamaica).  The Privy Council’s 
unanimous recommendation to Her Majesty that the sentences be commuted, 
signified a reprieve for more than 200 death sentenced prisoners in the
Caribbean.  The Judicial Privy Council, of the United Kingdom remains the 
13
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Extradition70 and Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice)71 from the 
Canadian Supreme Court provide instructive examples.  Both Ng 
and Kindler faced the death penalty if extradited to the United 
States.  The extradition treaty with the United States allowed the 
Canadian Minister of Justice to seek assurances that the death 
penalty would not be imposed or executed.  In both instances, the 
Minister ordered extradition without seeking such assurances.72  In 
both cases the Canadian Supreme Court found that the Minister of 
Justice had not abused his discretion in extraditing death-eligible
persons to the United States and that such extradition did not 
violate Canada’s Charter of Rights.73  Both men were extradited 
and in both cases an after-the-fact appeal was taken to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee.74  The Committee refused to 
hold that the death row phenomenon, by itself, constituted a 
human rights violation under the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights.75  It distinguished Soering, whose age and 
mental condition bolstered the claim that he would face inhuman 
and degrading treatment.76  Thus, in Kindler, the Human Rights 
Committee affirmed Canada’s decision to extradite.77  The
committee, however, ruled that Ng, (who faced death by cyanide 
asphyxiation, rather than lethal injection, as in Kindler’s case) was 
improperly extradited.78 Ng and Kindler made it clear that
international law provides no per se bar to extraditing death
eligible persons, and each case will have to be analyzed on a case by 
case basis.
B. Muddled Drift
One solution for extradition courts in abolitionist countries is 
to avoid international law altogether in coming to the conclusion 
ultimate court of appeal for sixteen Commonwealth countries.  Bertodano,
Fighting for Justice in Shadow of the Gallows, Sun. Telegraph Ltd. 16, Nov. 7, 1993.
70. [1991] 84 D.L.R. (4th) 498.
71. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
72. Id. at 780; Reference re Ng Extradition, [1991] 84 D.L.R. (4th) 498 at 
501.
73. Matthew W. Henning, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecution
Can Lead to International Incidents, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 347, 358 (1999).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 359.
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that there can be no extradition of anyone who potentially faces 
the death penalty.  This may have been the approach of the Italian 
Constitutional Court in Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia.79
The Venezia court refused to extradite a death-eligible U.S. citizen 
despite assurances from U.S. authorities that he would not receive 
the death penalty.  Instead, Venezia was forced to face trial in Italy 
for crimes committed in the United States.  The court reasoned 
that in Italy “the prohibition on the death penalty . . .  is absolute
and precludes extradition for a capital offense on the basis of an 
evaluation by government officials or the courts of the sufficiency 
of assurances[.]”80
The court relied entirely on Italian constitutional law without 
mention of international law.  Professor Bianchi of the University 
of Sienna speculated that “[i]t is hard to tell whether the court 
deliberately avoided” mention of international law because of the 
apparent “conflict between different treaty requirements” or lack of 
familiarity with “the relevant international law instruments.”81
Professor Bianchi points out that the Constitutional court had 
often invoked international law principles and trends in the past.82
In this case, the Italian Constitutional Court may have been
struggling with a way to create a per se bar to extradition in a 
context of international law that did not quite reach the right 
result.  It is overly facile in this context to accuse the court of 
“result oriented jurisprudence.”  Rather, this case properly may be 
viewed as a halting and somewhat anomalous step toward an 
international per se rule barring extradition of death-eligible
persons.  Of course, Italy’s refusal to extradite at all and its decision 
requiring trial in Italy went further than anything required under 
any interpretation of international law.  One does not know what 
the decision of that court might have been had there been clear 
international rules that absolutely guaranteed that there would be 
no possibility of capital punishment.  In short, Venezia may be either 
a halting step in the trend or just a very peculiar case.  Just which is 
not clear.
It should be clear from the foregoing that European countries 
79. Andrea Bianchi, International Decision: Venezia v. Ministero Di Grazia E 
Giustizia. Judgment No. 223. 79 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 815 (1996).  Italian 
Constitutional Court, June 27, 1996, 91 A.J.I.L. 727 (1997).
80. Id. at 727.
81. Id. at 731.
82. Id.
15
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that have ratified Optional Protocol No. 6 are not likely to extradite 
anyone who is death-eligible regardless of the circumstances.
Europe is for all practical purposes a death penalty-free extradition 
zone.83  It only remains for the rest of the world to sweep away fact-
bound analysis in favor of a more efficient and less contentious per 
se rule.  That event may depend in part upon intellectual support 
cases from around the world that creep toward a per se rule 
barring extradition in potentially capital cases.  That is what is 
happening.
C. Transition to an Absolute Rule
1. Canada’s Reversal: United States v. Burns
The most startling and perhaps clearest indicator of the
direction of death penalty extradition law after Soering is
unquestionably the Canadian Supreme Court’s dramatic about-face
in United States v. Burns.84  Recall that in 1991 Ng and Kindler had 
held that a decision of the Minister of Justice to extradite death-
eligible persons back to the United States did not violate the 
Canadian Charter of Rights. Burns, only ten years later and clearly 
influenced by the intervening trends in international law, reversed
course.
Canadians Glenn Sebastian Burns and Atif Ahmad Rafay both 
faced capital murder charges in the United States.  The Minister of 
Justice ordered extradition without seeking assurances.85  A
83.   This conclusion is strengthened by Protocol 13 (which opened for
signature May 2002).  Protocol 13 goes further than Protocol 6 and abolishes the 
death penalty under all circumstances including acts committed in time of war.
Moreover, Protocol 13 prohibits derogations and reservations.  Thirty-nine nations 
have signed Protocol 13 and five have ratified it.  It becomes effective three 
months after ten member states have expressed their consent to be bound.  With 
the advent of Protocol 13, extradition from Europe in capital cases without 
assurances as to the death penalty becomes almost unimaginable.  Death Penalty 
Information Center, The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.html.
84. [2001] D.L.R. (4th) 1.
85. Apparently Ministers of Justice exercised their prerogative to seek
assurances in death penalty cases rather sparingly.  The Ottawa Citizen
editorialized:
[I]f it is an unjustified evil for the government to kill people in
Canada, is it not a similar evil to participate in the killing of people in 
the United States?
No easy answer.  But the extradition treaty invites Canadian justice 
16
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unanimous Canadian Supreme Court held that while the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not create a per se rule 
barring extradition of death-eligible persons in all cases, “such 
assurances [agreeing not to impose the death penalty] are
constitutionally required in all but exceptional circumstances.”86
The Court declined to define or speculate on what might constitute 
“exceptional circumstances,” saying, “in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, which we refrain from trying to anticipate,
assurances in death penalty cases are always constitutionally
required.”87
Plainly, the Canadian Supreme Court is moving very close to a 
per se rule.  This is as close to a conclusive presumption as one can 
get without actually having it.  Ministers of Justice in Canada no 
doubt will get the message and routinely seek assurances before 
extradition in potentially capital cases.  Of course terrorists from al-
Qaeda might constitute those “exceptional circumstances” reserved 
in the opinion. Burns did nominally approve the “balancing
process” set out by Ng and Kindler.88  Close analysis of the Court’s 
rationale, however, demonstrates that Burns has jettisoned single-
minded reliance on the “death row phenomenon” or any other 
remediable administrative deficiencies.  It has moved to a rationale 
that is far more compatible with a per se rule than the equitable 
fact-balancing rule of Soering.  As we will demonstrate, Burns is only 
nominally a balancing case dependent on the individual facts of the 
matter at hand.
The greatest part of the Burns opinion turns on “the factors 
that appear to weigh against extradition without assurances that the 
death penalty will not be imposed.”89  Any fair reading of this 
section will satisfy the reader that most of the reasons for refusing 
to extradite in this case revolve around matters that could not be 
fixed by any retentionist nation, and indeed, revolve around trends 
that are only likely to cut more and more against capital
punishment.  Moreover, the innocence argument, which the Burns
ministers to avoid complicity in capital punishment, and they surely 
ought to try more often than once in 20 years.
Extradition Misgivings: Two accused killers have been extradited to the U.S. without 
Canada invoking a death-penalty safeguard, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 17, 1996, at A10.
86. Burns, [2001] D.L.R. (4th) at ¶ 8.
87. Id. at ¶ 65 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at ¶ 67.
89. Id. at ¶ 75.
17
Clarke: Terrorism, Extradition, and the Death Penalty
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
CLARKE FORMATTED.DOC 2/7/2003 2:20 PM
800 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3
Court makes for the first time,90 is fundamentally at odds with a 
cure for any capital punishment system.
The section analyzing factors that . . . weigh against extradition
begins with Section (a) “Principles of Criminal Justice as Applied in 
Canada”91 which focuses exclusively on Canada’s abolition of the 
death penalty and the values implicated by that abolition.  While 
general, abstract jurisprudential principles never can be dispositive
of narrowly specific issues, the fact that this opening section is cast 
in absolute terms may be seen as a harbinger of the rationale to 
follow.  The last part of the section is illustrative of the whole:
It is, however, incontestable that capital punishment . . .
engages the underlying values of the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.  It is final.  It is
irreversible.  Its imposition has been described as
arbitrary.  Its deterrent value has been doubted.  Its 
implementation necessarily causes psychological and
physical suffering.  It has been rejected by the Canadian 
Parliament for offences committed within Canada.  Its 
potential imposition in this case is thus a factor that
weighs against extradition without assurances.92
With the exception of the last sentence, every word presages a 
rationale that is virtually absolute.  As we will see, this rationale goes 
far beyond the broad platitudes of the first section.
Section (b) focuses on Canadian and international initiatives 
to abolish the death penalty.93  In page after carefully detailed page, 
the Court reports the worldwide trend toward abolition of the 
death penalty. Very little of this supports ad hoc determinations 
that would even occasionally permit the extradition of someone 
who faced the possibility of capital punishment.  Indeed, the Court 
points out that:
Amnesty International reports that in 1948, the year in 
which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
adopted, only eight countries were abolitionist.  In
January 1998 . . . 90 countries retained the death penalty, 
while 61 were totally abolitionist, 14 (including Canada at 
the time) were classified as abolitionist for ordinary
crimes and 27 were considered to be abolitionist de facto 
(no executions for the past 10 years) for a total of 102 
abolitionist countries.  At the present time, it appears that 
90. The author is unaware of any international extradition case before Burns
that makes the innocence argument as forcefully and as well as the Court in Burns.
91. Burns, [2001] D.L.R. (4th) at ¶¶ 75-6.
92. Id. at ¶ 80.
93. Id. at ¶¶ 78-9.
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the death penalty is now abolished (apart from
exceptional offences such as treason) in 108 countries.
These general statistics mask the important point that 
abolitionist states include all of the major democracies 
except some of the United States, India and Japan.
According to statistics filed by Amnesty International on 
this appeal, 85 percent of the world’s executions in 1999 
were accounted for by only five countries: the United 
States, China, the Congo, Saudi Arabia and Iran.94
The Court does acknowledge that “[t]his evidence does not 
establish an international law norm against . . . extradition to face 
the death penalty.”95  This language is certainly consistent with an 
ad hoc approach.  But the rationale undergirding it is absolutist.
In any event, no reasonable person would argue that Burns speaks 
with only one voice or that the case directly and unambiguously 
posits a per se rule against extradition of death-eligible persons.
The claim herein is more modest—that Burns is a transitional case 
that speaks one way while moving in another.  Such cases are not
unheard of in the history of jurisprudence.96
Only Section (c)97 treats issues that are unambiguously fact-
bound and which would lead to an ad hoc balancing approach.
Here the Court, in one lone paragraph, details the mitigating 
factors that international courts since Soering have looked to in 
denying extradition.
Section (d), which embraces “other factors weighing against 
extradition,”98 may be the most telling part of the entire opinion.
The largest and first part of this section deals not with the
traditional “death row phenomenon” argument first raised in
Soering, but rather with the fact that innocent people are being 
convicted of capital crimes, not just in countries like Iran and Iraq, 
but in the United States.  Perhaps to ease some of the sting of the
94. Id. at ¶ 91.
95. Id. at ¶ 89.
96. The use of the word jurisdiction to describe the ambit of a writ of habeas 
corpus long after courts had gained the power to release persons for non-
jurisdictional errors is another example of this process whereby jurisprudential 
language expands and expands until it is clear that the concept has been radically
changed. See, e.g., Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 375, 402-23 (1998) (detailing historical development of the
expansion of habeas corpus from a narrowly confined writ limited to jurisdictional 
error to one that reached many fundamental constitutional errors that lay beyond 
original conceptions of jurisdiction).
97. Burns, [2001] D.L.R. (4th) at ¶¶ 92-3.
98. Id. at ¶¶ 93-4.
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charge the Court begins, not with innocent people on the U.S. 
death row, but rather with the Canadian experience with
convicting innocent people of what would, before abolition, have 
been capital crimes.  The Court spends ten full paragraphs on 
innocence issues in Canada.99  This breast-beating is not without 
purpose.  It allows the Court to pull no punches when it turns to 
the U.S. experience.  In thirteen paragraphs it outlines the now 
well-known problems from the repeated calls for moratoria, to the 
Illinois experience where there were thirteen exonerations for 
every twelve executions and the recently disclosed two out of three 
error rate in the system.
The Burns Court expended more energy and ink analyzing the 
problems associated with miscarriages of justice in capital and 
potentially capital cases than it did with any other issue.  This is 
important because, unlike other administrative critiques of the 
death penalty (for example, the death row phenomenon),
innocence is not an issue that could likely be corrected by the 
receiving nation.  When one looks at administrative issues in any 
judicial system, one generally looks at things that, at least in theory, 
can be corrected.  If corrected, the objection predicated thereon 
disappears.  If Due Process is being denied in a particular nation, 
and extradition is denied on that basis, that can be rectified.
Presumably, the “death row phenomenon” can be rectified.
Indeed, the Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA)100 is an attempt by the U.S. to do just that.  It is, however, 
hard to see how any retentionist nation can rectify the problem of 
convicting the innocent in capital cases.  While this seems on first 
impression like a factual matter susceptible of an administrative 
cure, the practical impediments make such a case only a thin 
theoretical possibility.  It is hard to imagine a judicial system that 
did not convict the innocent, and in retentionist regimes, this 
means executing the innocent.101  The efficiencies of speed
generated by such laws as the AEDPA, by cutting out procedural 
protections, increase the probability of executing the innocent.
Perversely, the attempt to repair the death row phenomenon works 
to increase the problem of the innocent at the gallows.  It is not 
easy to see how this tension can be resolved.  Moreover, hydraulic 
99. Id. at ¶¶ 95-104.
100. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1999) (effective April 24, 1996).
101. See Laurie Anne Whitt, Alan W. Clarke & Eric Lambert, Innocence Matters: 
How Innocence Recasts the Death Penalty Debate, 38 CRIM. LAW BULL. 670 (2002).
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pressure within the capital punishment system probably insures 
that the U.S. capital punishment regime increases the likelihood of 
convicting and ultimately executing the innocent.102
By focusing on innocence, Burns presents a conundrum.  It 
speaks in language that purports to require the Minister of Justice 
(and lower courts) to engage in fact-bound analysis in the face of a 
strong presumption against extradition in potentially capital cases.
But it provides criteria in its rationale that are virtually impossible 
to satisfy.  The criteria cut against each other such that if you satisfy 
one, you are forced to violate the other—repair the length of stays 
on death row at the expense of increasing the probability of 
executing the innocent.  Thomas Hobson could not have improved 
on this.103
If the Canadian Supreme Court remains faithful to its
rationale in Burns, extradition of death-eligibles to the U.S. absent 
assurances has ended. Burns, while nominally a balancing case like 
Soering, rests on principles fundamentally at odds with that precept.
Thus, Burns is a key transitional case from a balancing fact-bound
approach to a per se approach.  Given the trends elsewhere Burns
presages, but does not announce, a new, stronger, international 
rule in death penalty extradition cases.
2. South Africa: Mohamed & Others v. RSA & Others
In an as yet little-noticed case, the South African
Constitutional Court dropped a potential bombshell. Mohamed & 
Another v. President of the RSA & Others104 announced a per se rule 
against either extradition or deportation in lieu of extradition.
While the decision was predicated on South African Constitutional 
law, the court’s extensive discussion of international law placed the 
case a step closer to an international rule absolutely barring
extradition of death-eligibles absent adequate assurances that the 
death penalty will not be imposed or executed.  The fact that this 
102. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common 
in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 475-96 (1996) (discussing the “production of 
errors” that occurs throughout the whole criminal justice process leading up to 
capital punishment).
103.  Thomas Hobson was a 17th-century horse trader who owned a stable and 
gave customers the option to look at all of his horses, but would only allow 
customers to purchase the horse nearest the door.  The term “Hobson’s choice” 
usually refers to the necessity of accepting one of two equally objectionable things.
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1076 (3d ed. 1993).
104. 2001 (7) BCLR 685 (CC).
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case came out of Africa is significant in that it demonstrates that 
courts in abolitionist countries from all over the world are refusing 
extradition under these circumstances.
The case also closes the door to immigration authorities using 
deportation procedures to circumvent the extradition
requirements, thus making extrajudicial political deals more
difficult.  If followed internationally (and this case seems to be well 
within the mainstream trend) this could be one of the more 
significant extradition cases.
Mohamed, a suspected member of al-Qaeda and a Tanzanian 
national, was sought by the United States in connection with his 
role in the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.105
Found in Cape Town, South Africa, he was detained and ultimately 
deported to the United States.106  Because immigration authorities 
treated the matter as a deportation, no assurances of any kind with 
respect to the death penalty were sought or given.107  A co-
defendant, Mr. Mahmoud Mahmud Salim was extradited to the 
United States from Germany, which did seek and receive
assurances that the death penalty would neither be imposed nor 
executed.108  South Africa, like Germany, has abolished the death 
penalty.109  The Constitutional Court held that “[t]he handing over 
of Mohamed to the United States government agents for removal 
by them to the United States was unlawful.”110  Since Mohamed had 
already been extradited to the United States and was in fact in the 
middle of his capital murder trial,111 the South African
Constitutional Court’s options were quite limited; it ordered that 
“the full text of this judgment to be drawn to the attention of . . .
the Federal Court . . . as a matter of urgency.”112  The U.S. District 
Judge ruled that the defendant had the right to present the South 
African Court’s ruling to the jury at the penalty phase of trial.113
Although the decision was otherwise irrelevant to the defendant’s 
105. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 at ¶¶ 7-10.
106. Id. at ¶ 11.
107. Id. at ¶ 25.
108. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 at ¶ 44.
109. S v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
110. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 at ¶ 67.
111. Jury to Hear South Africa Constitutional Court Ruling as a Mitigating Factor in 
Penalty Phase, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 2001, at 17.
112. Mohamed, 2001 (7) BCLR 685 at. ¶73 § (5).
113. See, e.g., Alan W. Clarke, Virginia’s Capital Murder Sentencing Proceeding: A 
Defense Perspective, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 341 (1984) for a discussion of the sentencing 
or penalty phase of a capital murder trial.
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character, it was nonetheless a mitigating factor under federal law, 
which permits juries to consider the fact that “[a]nother defendant 
or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished 
by death.”114  The jury ultimately hung on the life or death issue at 
the penalty phase and thus, Mohamed was sentenced to life
imprisonment.115
While the Mohamed Court ultimately relied on the South 
African Constitution, it analyzed international extradition law in 
potentially capital cases at great length, repeatedly citing inter alia 
Burns and Soering.  Despite Burns and Soering’s less than absolutist 
approaches, the South African Constitutional Court nonetheless 
laid down an absolute rule not dependent on any fact balancing or 
other ad hoc determination.  While this decision is not binding on 
other nations or any of the International Human Rights tribunals,
its reasoning is likely to be highly influential, particularly in
Commonwealth nations.116  While no court has yet plainly stated 
that extradition of a person facing the death penalty is absolutely 
barred under international law under all circumstances, absent 
satisfactory assurances, this case is another unmistakable step in 
that direction.
D. Other Evidence For a Per Se Rule
There are a variety of international treaties beyond the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms that speak to the issue of extraditing death-eligible
people to retentionist countries, including the Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Aiming at Abolition of the Death Penalty,117 and the 
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) (2002).
115. Benjamin Weiser, Embassy Bombers Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 4, 
at 2.
116. See Bruce Zagaris S. African Constitutional Court Rules Deporting Alleged 
Terrorist to U.S. Violated Rights, INT’L ENFORCEMENT LAW REP., Section: International 
Terrorism (Dec. 2001) Vol. 17, No. 12.
On the one hand, the ruling has limited solace for Mohamed since he 
has been deported, tried and convicted by the U.S.  On the other 
hand, his case has importance for future situations in South Africa and 
the Commonwealth of countries, since the decision will be noted and 
may be precedent in other cases, especially at a time when countries 
are requesting custody of many persons accused of transnational
terrorism.
Id.
117. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
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American Convention on Human Rights.118  It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to canvass all treaties having an impact on this subject.
However, a few brief notes about trends in extradition law as it 
affects the death penalty are in order.
From the foregoing sections it may seem that only Europe and 
perhaps Canada and South Africa strongly oppose extradition in 
capital cases unless assurances are given.  This misperception is an 
artifact of the cases that the author has chosen to highlight
revolving around a very limited theme concerning the strength and 
posture of the international rule in question.  But the implication 
of these cases is greater than that which might be supposed.  One 
must look at the actual situation in other regions of the world 
which may not have quite so developed a jurisprudence on the 
subject to understand how this issue is likely to play out in other 
regions of the world.
For example, the Organization of American States (“OAS”) 
involves all thirty-five nations of the Americas.  Of these nations 
only the United States, Guyana, Guatemala, and Belize retain the 
death penalty.119  The American Convention on Human Rights 
contains language protecting against “cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment,”120 and is similar to European Covenant 
Article 3, the subject of the Soering case.  Moreover, Article 9 of the 
1981 Inter-American Convention on Extradition mandates that 
member States “not grant extradition when the offense in question 
is punishable . . . by the death penalty” absent assurances that the 
death penalty will not be imposed.121
The attitude of our OAS neighbors concerning the United 
States’ use of the death penalty is decidedly negative.  The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in 1987 “found that the 
United States’ practice of executing juveniles violated the American 
Declaration” of the Rights and Duties of Man.122  How likely is it 
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1989, 1991 U.N.T.S. 414 (entered into 
force July 11, 1991).
118. Organization of American States: American Convention on Human
Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force 
July 18, 1978).
119. Michelle McKee, Tinkering With the Machinery of Death: Understanding Why 
the United States Use of the Death Penalty Violates Customary International Law, 6 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 153, 159 (2000).
120. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 118, Art. 5 § 2.
121. Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention on
Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 723, art. 9.
122. Laura Dalton, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation
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that the OAS would sanction extradition on conditions less
stringent than their European counterparts?  Moreover, Mexico 
consistently seeks assurances in capital cases before extraditing to 
the United States.123  Thus, the United States is, for all practical 
purposes, sandwiched between two nations that will not extradite in 
capital cases absent assurances.
In addition, the rule of non-inquiry is undergoing significant 
erosion in human rights extradition cases lying beyond the death 
penalty arena.  This trend makes it ever more unlikely that an 
international court would, under any circumstances, allow
extradition in a potential capital case without ironclad assurances 
that the death penalty would not be imposed.  It likely will affect 
the Bush administration’s attempt to use military courts.
V. CONCLUSION
One hundred and eleven nations of the world have now 
abolished the death penalty.124  Most are unlikely to extradite 
anyone, even members of al-Qaeda, if they realistically face a 
possibility of receiving the death penalty in the United States.  As
more and more nations abolish capital punishment, first de facto 
and then de jure, and as the rule against extradition to retentionist 
nations becomes stronger, the likelihood of increasing tension in 
U.S. foreign policy becomes evident.
Following September 11, America’s need to question al-Qaeda
suspects in Spain may be a difficult task in light of Spain’s refusal to 
extradite unless the United States hewes to European trends
regarding both the death penalty and the use of military courts.125
Meanwhile, Great Britain has been tying itself in knots over the 
of an Emerging Rule of Customary International Law, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 181 
(1990) (citations omitted).  Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Stanford v. Kentucky,
outlines the various human rights treaties either signed or ratified by the U.S. 
which “explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.”  492 U.S. 361, 390 (1989).
123. The extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States “clearly 
prohibits the extradition of criminals when the fugitive awaits capital punishment 
in the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do not permit capital 
punishment for the specific offense.”  Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta, 
Mexico-United States Extradition and Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers 
- 150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande’s Winding Courses, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
519, 539 (1997).
124. See supra note 5.
125. Bob Kemper, U.S.-Spain Pledge Anti-Terror Cooperation; Leaders Downplay
Extradition of 8 Al Qaeda Suspects, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 29, 2001 at N4.
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same problem of extradition to the United States.126  The French 
Justice Minister, Marylise Lebranchu, warned that France will
oppose the death penalty for French citizen and alleged al Qaeda 
member Zacarias Moussaoui, and that a death sentence will create 
“diplomatic difficulties.”127  Moussaoui, who was apprehended in 
Minnesota, presents no extradition problems, but France’s strong 
opposition in his case makes it even clearer (if more clarity were 
needed) that no terrorist, whatever his or her crime, will be 
extradited from France without ironclad assurances on the death 
penalty.128  Germany is also refusing to extradite Islamic militants to 
countries where they face the possibility of the death penalty.129
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is quoted as saying that 
the U.S. military will “try to prevent enemy leaders from falling into 
the hands of peacekeeping troops from allied nations that might 
oppose capital punishment.”130  One wonders to what extent U.S.
soldiers might interfere with British or French troops to accomplish 
that end, or what the diplomatic consequences might be if there 
was an armed showdown?
Plainly, this issue will continue to nettle U.S. foreign policy 
experts with repercussions that are wide ranging and difficult to 
predict.  Given that “the hunt for fresh targets in pursuing al-Qaeda
has now spread to Africa, South America and the Balkans,”131 the 
problems for U.S. foreign policy can only increase.  Thus, the 
question becomes: will U.S. policy and public opinion change to 
conform to international norms, or will the United States continue 
to pay an increasingly heavy price for its love affair with capital 
punishment?
126. Philip Johnston, Britain Could Face Dilemma Over bin Laden Death Penalty,
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London) Dec. 11, 2001, at 14.
127. Minister Warns of Rift Over Death Penalty For Sept. 11 Suspect, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 12, 2001, at *1.
128. Id.
129. Interior Minister Otto Schily ordered raids that captured persons having 
alleged ties to Osama bin Laden.  Turkey has demanded the extradition of one, 
but Germany has refused because of the possibility of the death penalty under 
Turkish law. Germany Targets Muslim Groups, (Dec. 12, 2001) at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1705606.stm.
130. Paul Richter, U.S. Leaders Begin to Plan Ways to Bring Prisoners to Justice,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 12, 2001 at A13.
131. Ed Vulliamy et al., US Launches Hunt for Terror Camps in Somalia, THE
OBSERVER, Dec. 9, 2001, at 1.
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